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Abstract. VANETs have the potential to dramatically increase road
safety by giving drivers more time to react adequately to dangerous situ-
ations. To prevent abuse of VANETs, a security infrastructure is needed
that ensures security requirements like message integrity, confidential-
ity, and availability. After giving more details on the requirements we
propose a security infrastructure that uses asymmetric as well as sym-
metric cryptography and tamper resistant hardware. While fulfilling the
requirements, our proposal is especially designed to protect privacy of the
VANET users and proves to be very efficient in terms of computational
needs and bandwidth overhead.
1 Introduction
The term vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is used for a subgroup of mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs, defined in [1]). The distinguishing property of the
VANET is that it is formed mainly by vehicles. This implies that node move-
ment is restricted by factors like road course, encompassing traffic and traffic
regulations. Because of the restricted node movement it is a feasible assumption
that the VANET will be supported by some fixed infrastructure that assists with
some services and can provide access to stationary networks [2]. The fixed in-
frastructure will be deployed at critical locations like slip roads, service stations,
dangerous intersections or places well-known for hazardous weather conditions.
Nodes are expected to communicate by means of North American DSRC
standard [3] that employs the IEEE 802.11p standard for wireless communica-
tion. To allow communication with participants out of radio range, messages
have to be forwarded by other nodes (multi-hop communication). Vehicles are
not subject to the strict energy, space and computing capabilities restrictions
normally adopted for MANETs [4]. More challenging is the potentially very high
speed of the nodes (up to 250 km/h) and the large dimensions of the VANET.
The primary VANET’s goal is to increase road safety. To achieve this, the
vehicles act as sensors and exchange warnings or – more generally – telematics
information (like current speed, location or ESP activity) that enables the drivers
to react early to abnormal and potentially dangerous situations like accidents,
traffic jams or glaze. In addition, authorized entities like police or firefighters
should be able to send alarm signals and instructions e.g. to clear their way
or stop other road users. Besides that, the VANET should increase comfort by
means of value-added services like location based services or Internet on the road
[5].
These three application categories (“warnings and telematics information”
(W), “alarm signals and instructions” (A), and “value-added services” (V)) im-
ply different security and privacy requirements with respect to the protection
goals integrity, confidentiality and availability. Nevertheless, there is a common
need for a security infrastructure establishing mutual trust and enabling cryp-
tography. The security infrastructure therefore includes all technical and organi-
zational measures and facilities needed. After defining the requirements for any
such security infrastructure (section 2) we present a new proposal (section 3)
that particularly aims to protect privacy of the participants and is designed to
be very efficient in terms of computing capabilities and communication band-
width. Our system is evaluated in section 4. Section 5 outlines our conclusion
and future work.
2 Security Requirements
In this section we explain the requirements for a VANET security infrastructure.
If necessary, we distinguish between the three application categories W, A, and
V as defined in section 1. The requirements are summarized in table 1.
2.1 Integrity
The security infrastructure has to provide mechanisms that prevent or at least
detect message modification (I1). This hinders malicious nodes from modifying
forwarded messages and protects message integrity for all application categories.
Alarm signals and instructions sent from authorized nodes like police cars,
fire engines or ambulances have to be obeyed by the addressees. Therefore, the
authenticity and integrity of the message as well as the authorization of the
sender must be provable instantly without further information (I2a). In contrast,
for warnings and telematics messages plausibility checks can be conducted by
means of in car sensors or messages received from other VANET nodes. Hence no
unchangeable and unique identity would be necessary in this case. Moreover, to
hamper movement profile creation it would be preferable to cloak sender identity
especially in periodically sent messages (P1). Nevertheless, ex post accountability
and non-repudiation is necessary to be able to prosecute misuse of the VANET
like injection of bogus information (I2b). Therefore anonymous participation
should not be allowed, pseudonymous participation is desirable.
This ex post identification must only be allowed in severe cases like accidents
with death results or sending bogus warnings. Automated traffic surveillance or
automated prosecution – e.g. based on the sent telematics data – must not be
allowed with regard to multilateral security (P2). Multilateral security means
taking the interests of all parties involved into account. In this case, interests of
law enforcement (to prosecute each violation of law with as few effort as possible)
I1 Data integrity
I2a Immediate sender authentication
I2b Ex post accountability
C1 Different levels of confidentiality
C2 Protection of the security infrastructure
P1 Protection against profile generation
P2 Protection against surveillance
A1 Computational and bandwidth efficiency
Table 1. Requirements
have to be balanced with interests of citizens (not to be monitored regardless of
whether a suspicion exists). It is an interesting question how to define what such
severe cases of VANET abuse are. Nevertheless, it will not be answered here be-
cause we focus on the technical details of the security infrastructure. We assume
that in-car sensor data is correct. Additionally, we expect integration of correct
time and position information in all messages to protect against replay and po-
sition spoofing attacks. This information is available from an infrastructure like
Galileo [6].
2.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality requirements vary heavily between the three application cate-
gories. While confidentiality of alarm signals is negligible in most cases, it can
e.g. be crucial for services subject to costs. The security infrastructure there-
fore has to provide mechanisms that support different levels of confidentiality
(C1). For example these levels could be no confidentiality, confidentiality against
outsiders and confidentiality against all except direct communication partners.
Besides application data administrative messages like routing protocol in-
formation or messages containing cryptographic material have to be protected
against eavesdropping. Also, the cryptographic information held by participants
or centralized instances has to be protected against unauthorized access. More
generally, the security infrastructure has to be protected against attacks (C2).
2.3 Availability
Because most VANET messages are related to driving conditions and road safety,
real-time processing of these messages is crucial. To be able to fulfill the above
integrity and confidentiality requirements VANET nodes have to carry out ad-
ditional cryptographic operations that extend message processing. Mechanisms
to protect message integrity increase the message length. To satisfy the given
real-time constraints the mechanisms of the security infrastructure must be as
efficient as possible in terms of computational and bandwidth needs (A1). De-
spite the fact that there is no feasible protection against jamming attacks [7]
actions must be taken that complicate denial-of-service attacks and therefore
increase availability.
3 Proposal
In this section we present our proposal for a VANET security infrastructure that
is designed to be very efficient in terms of computing capabilities and commu-
nication bandwidth while fulfilling all security and privacy requirements. After
a once-only initialization it employs asymmetric cryptography within a public
key infrastructure (PKI) for messages influencing road safety. All other messages
(especially the periodically sent telematics messages) are protected by a system
employing symmetric cryptography that is much faster and protects privacy of
the participants better than the asymmetric part. After outlining our proposal
in section 3.1 we give some more details on the once-only initialization (3.2) and
the symmetric system part (3.3). Figure 1 shows a VANET with the different
message types.
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Fig. 1. VANET with different message types
3.1 Outline and asymmetric part
In the asymmetric part of the VANET we employ a PKI with vehicle-related
identities (VRI) in form of a private key and a corresponding certificate. The
certificates are issued by a certification authority (CA) in each country that
should be operated by the governmental transportation authority (GTA). We
suggest a VRI issued by the GTA because of the following reasons:
– A VRI is the digital equivalent of the current situation: The license plate is
a fixed pseudonym for the owner of the vehicle and only GTA can link the
pseudonym with the real world identity of the owner. The driver is not known
for sure but this is consistent with current legislation in most countries.
– The GTA is already known and somewhat trusted by the citizens.
– Employing GTA as CA would – at least in the EU – be cost efficient because
the digital tachograph system demands that each member country has a
CA issuing certificates used in the digital tachograph hardware [8]. In other
words most European GTAs already operate a CA.
Each vehicle stores its VRI and at least the root certificate of the country CA
in tamper resistant hardware (TRH). For warnings integrity and authenticity is
ensured (req. I1, I2a/b) by adding a digital signature and the sending node’s
certificate (see fig. 2). The recipient can check the signature and the identity of
the sender included in the certificate1. Because warnings are sent very seldom
and only distributed to a small geographical region they can not be used to
generate movement profiles. Therefore digitally signing warnings does not harm
privacy of the driver in an unacceptable manner.
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Fig. 2. Message with asymmetric protection
People with special privileges like police officers additionally get individual-
related identities (IRI), in form of a private key and a corresponding certificate
stored on a smart card. To be able to use their special privileges the certificate
of the sending vehicle and the certificate of the driver have to be submitted
to the CA. After checking the two certificates, the CA issues a certificate (and
corresponding key pair) that includes attributes that grant authorization to send
a defined set of alarm signals and/or instructions. This certificate is valid e.g.
for eight hours (one shift) and used to add a digital signature to alarm signals
and instructions. Recipients can check message integrity and authorization of
the sender instantly and do not have to check revocation information due to the
short validity of the certificate (req. I1, I2a).
Taking into account performance (req. A1) and privacy requirements (req.
P1, P2) it is not desirable to digitally sign all messages2 with the vehicles cer-
tificate. Therefore geographically distributed trusted third parties (GTTPs) are
employed which enable pseudonymous participation in the VANET as well as
message encryption and authentication within their assigned geographical re-
gions by means of symmetric cryptography. The participation in the symmetric
protected part of the VANET requires communication with a GTTP from time
to time. If a VANET node is not able to contact his GTTP he has to use
1 If the sending vehicle’s certificate was issued by another country CA, cross-
certificates are needed.
2 Especially the periodically sent telematics information including current position
and speed could easily be abused to create movement profiles. In addition, these
so-called beacons are sent very often (approximately every 10 to 300 ms [9, 2]) what
results in a lot of computational and bandwidth overhead.
asymmetric cryptography and cannot decrypt or verify messages protected with
symmetric cryptography. We want to point out that any VANET participant is
able to participate in the asymmetric part of the VANET after the once-only
initialization. This means he can understand and send safety critical VANET
messages even if he is never able to communicate with a GTTP. We give more
details on the symmetric part after explaining the once-only initialization phase.
3.2 Initialization
At production time each vehicle is equipped with TRH that cannot be removed
without being destroyed. Then the car manufacturer installs the root certificate
(CERTRoot) of the GTA the vehicle is sold to – e.g. CERTRootDE for Germany –
and a symmetric key. The symmetric key is also saved on a smart card. This
pre-shared key is used to encrypt communication between TRH and the smart
card (req. C2).
Vehicle manufacturer:
- Installation of TRH
- Store CERTRootXX in TRH
- Store pre-shared key in TRH
and smart card
Owner of vehicle A:
- Generation of SKTRHA and PKTRHA
- Physical deactivation of SKTRHA and
PKTRHA generation function
- Generation of SKSCA and PKSCA and transfer
to smart card
- Check and probably installation of CERTRootXX
After registration:
- Installation of CERTTRHA
Local admission office:
- Read PKTRHA
- Check owner identity
- Verify physical deactivation of key pair generation
- Register data with GTA
GTA:
- Issue CERTTRHA
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Fig. 3. Once-only initialization process
After receiving his new vehicle (and the smart card) the customer connects
the smart card to the TRH and starts the initialization process. TRH checks
connection to the smart card and generates two asymmetric key pairs. One is
used as VRI and is saved in TRH (e.g. PKTRHA and SKTRHA for vehicle A).
TRH ensures that only one key pair can be saved and the secret key (SKTRHA)
never leaves TRH (req. C2). The second key pair is digitally signed with the
first one and saved on the smart card. This key pair (PKSCA and SKSCA)
is used to authenticate the owner. Configuration changes like saving new or
deleting old root certificates in TRH are allowed only after authentication with
the smart card. This ensures that only the owner is authorized to change the
TRH configuration. If the vehicle is sold the new owner can generate a new key
pair and delete the old one.
If there are no errors in the initialization process the possibility to generate
a TRH key pair (PKTRHA and SKTRHA) has to be physically destroyed (e.g.
by melting a fuse after key-pair generation). This ensures that VRI cannot be
changed any more (at least until TRH is removed; partly req. I2a/b). Demanding
that the owner generates the key pair ensures that vehicle manufacturers do not
know VRIs of their vehicles (partly req. P1).
The VRI then is registered with the GTA in the normal registration process of
a new vehicle at the local admission office. This means the local admission office
has to read PKTRHA and must check that key pair generation is deactivated.
Then it saves VRI within the existing GTA registers and therefore is able to link
VRI to owner identity. Then GTA issues a certificate (CERTTRHA) that is saved
in vehicle’s TRH. TRH can check validity by means of the stored root certificate
(CERTRootDE ). Communication between the local admission office and GTA
has to be protected by the usual means of network security like firewalls, VPNs,
etc. (req. C2) and shall not be discussed here.
The fact that the owner can check and store root certificates in TRH ensures
that vehicle manufacturers or maintenance personal is not able to operate their
own certificate hierarchy by installing own root certificates in TRH (req. C2). On
the other hand, the owner has to be made responsible for correct configuration
of root certificates. Fig. 3 shows the initialization process.
3.3 Symmetric Part
As already mentioned, beacons and messages of the value-added services are
protected by means of symmetric cryptography. To be able to participate, node
A uses a challenge response protocol and CERTTRHA to authenticate to the lo-
cal GTTP. To increase availability, GTTP should be reachable via the VANET
as well as via other communication infrastructures like GSM. GTTP has to be
independent from law enforcement and GTA (see later). After authenticating
itself GTTP issues a pseudonym PA and an associated symmetric key kMACP A
that is unique to the VRI for a certain period of time and stores the relation
between VRI and PA. It also issues the symmetric keys kMACALL and kc. These
are the same for all VANET users in a certain geographic region and a certain
time period. TRH ensures that the symmetric keys are kept secret (req. C2).
The exchange of the symmetric keys has to be encrypted. The necessary encryp-
tion keys can for example be generated by a Diffie-Hellman key exchange after
mutual authentication. Varying levels of confidentiality can easily be achieved
by additionally encrypting the sent data with keys based on VRI or other service
specific certificates (req. C1).
Messages are assembled inside the TRH. First PA is added after the data to
be sent. Then a message authentication code (MAC1) computed with kMACP A
is added, followed by MAC2 computed with kMACALL . The whole message is
encrypted with kc (see fig. 4). Outsiders not participating in the VANET are
not able to see any identity or data, because messages are encrypted. Profile
generation and eavesdropping from outsiders therefore is prevented (req. C1,
P1). To hinder profile generation by VANET participants GTTPs can assign a
number of pseudonyms to a vehicle that are changed frequently. Additionally,
the pseudonyms are just valid for a short time interval. After that time inter-
val a given pseudonym could belong to another vehicle what makes linking of
pseudonyms to generate a movement or service usage profile pretty hard.
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Fig. 4. Message with symmetric protection
VANET participants (or more precisely their TRH) are able to decipher
messages with the help of kc and check integrity using MAC2 computed with
kMACALL (req. I1). Ex post accountability (req. I2b) is ensured by employing
MAC1 computed with kMACP A . Only TRH of the sending vehicle and GTTP
know kMACP A . Therefore, (only) GTTP can confirm if a given message is really
from the claimed sender by checking MAC1. This only works if all computations
are carried out in TRH and nobody is able to get to know the symmetric keys
or influence message construction. Therefore it is crucial to design TRH with a
self-destruction mechanism that is activated if anybody is trying to manipulate
the TRH (req. C2).
Req. P2 (protection against surveillance) is accomplished by employing inde-
pendent GTTPs that have to follow strict procedures before revealing the VRI
associated with a given pseudonym at a certain time. Only with this VRI law
enforcement is able to find the owner of the vehicle by using the GTA register.
We want to point out that while achieving non-repudiation privacy is protected.
Trust is distributed between GTTPs and GTA: GTTPs do not know the real
identities of the vehicle owners, GTA does not know the relationship between
VRI and pseudonym.
4 Evaluation and Related Work
Our proposal ensures message integrity (I1) by means of digital signatures and
MAC2. Immediate sender authentication for alarm signals and instructions (I2a)
is ensured by using short time certificates that can be linked to a specific driver
and vehicle. For all other messages ex post accountability (I2b) is achieved
by adding a digital signature based on VRI or MAC1 respectively. Protection
against profile generation (P1) is ensured by employing changing pseudonyms
for frequently sent messages and messages of value-added services. The inde-
pendent GTTPs ensure that automated surveillance is not possible (P2). Law
enforcement and GTA know the VRI and the identity of the owner but cannot
link this information to a pseudonym. Only in severe cases like accidents with
death results GTTP has to reveal the connection between a given pseudonym
and VRI. In addition, GTTP does not know the real identity corresponding to
a given VRI. Different levels of confidentiality (C1) can be used by encrypting
message data with VRI certificates, symmetric keys or other service specific key
material. The security infrastructure is protected (C2) by means of encrypting
all key management messages and employing TRH that ensures that nobody can
influence message generation or get to know symmetric or private keys.
We now want to show the computational and bandwidth efficiency (A1) of
our solution. We assume a message length of 300 byte what is feasible for alarm
signals, warnings and beacons. For the asymmetric part we further assume the
usage of RSA with SHA-256 (key length 2048 bit). The symmetric part employs
HMAC SHA-256 (key length 192 bit) and AES (key length 192 bit). According
to [10] this ensures adequate security till at least 2020. Pseudonyms are 48 bit
in length.
If we assume the smallest possible (non standard) certificate consisting only
of a public key and a digital signature we get 2048bit + 2048bit = 4096bit. The
digital signature is additional 2048bit. Summing this up (768byte) and adding the
message length we get 1068byte what translates in 768byte/1068byte = 72% se-
curity overhead. For the symmetric part we get the following: PA+2∗HMAC =
48bit+2∗256bit = 70byte. In total this is 370byte and a security overhead of just
70byte/370byte = 19%. Key management messages are negligible because they
are sent very seldom (e.g. once a day). Revocation lists are not needed because
of employing short time certificates for alarm signals and instructions as well as
the possibility to check plausibility of warnings by means of in-car sensor data
and messages received by other VANET participants. Recall that far the most
messages exchanged are beacons (approximately every 10 to 300 ms). These are
protected by symmetric cryptography that is very efficient in terms of additional
security overhead compared to messages protected by asymmetric cryptography.
Using a middle class PC-system we found that the symmetric part is faster than
the asymmetric part by a factor of approximately 600.
There are only few proposals for VANET security infrastructures so far. Most
researchers ([2, 11, 12]) propose a PKI solution, with anonymous or pseudony-
mous certificates issued by the CA. This solutions add digital signatures to each
message and do not provide encryption of messages. The main drawbacks in
comparison to our solution are that VANET participants have to ultimately
trust the CA and computational needs and bandwidth overhead are enormous
(remember the numbers above). In addition, up to date revocation information
is necessary. Due to the fact that messages are not encrypted even outsiders can
eavesdrop and possibly create movement profiles. [13] suggest a system based on
symmetric cryptography. The main problem of this proposal is that the vehicles
have to contact a base station to decrypt and verify messages what is not fea-
sible taking into account the real-time demands and the very high mobility in
the VANET. Some other authors ([14–16]) outline security and privacy issues in
VANETs but do not present a security infrastructure.
5 Conclusion and Further Aspects
After motivating why some kind of security infrastructure is needed in a VANET,
we discussed requirements like message integrity and non-repudiation for such
infrastructures. In section 3 we made a proposal how a security infrastructure
could be constructed that uses asymmetric as well as symmetric cryptography
and tamper resistant hardware to fulfill the requirements. While fulfilling all re-
quirements our proposal is especially designed to protect privacy of the VANET
users and proved to be very efficient in terms of computational needs and band-
width overhead (see sec. 4).
In our future work we will refine the proposal and discuss issues like the best
schedule for changing the symmetric keys and pseudonyms. In addition, the best
size of the geographic regions for the GTTPs will be determined by employing
simulations.
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